BR
2026 archiveThis page is part of our coverage of the 2026 elections and is no longer updated. See the archive

Model log

A record of changes and commentary on the Plano Político 2026 Presidential Model.

← back to the model

24 Oct 2026 · P(Flávio) 84% · runoff polls: 45 (+8) after the first round, 143 beforegenerated automatically · move above the threshold
19 Oct 2026 – 23 Oct 20265 days · P(Flávio) 81% → 84% · 2 days with no change to the published figuregenerated automatically

Vox Brasil polls removed

18 Oct 2026 · P(Flávio) 80% (+1) · runoff polls: 18 (-1) after the first round, 143 before

As of today, Vox Brasil's polls are temporarily excluded from the Aggregator and the Presidential Model. As we did with Veritá on 18 August, we explain our reasons here. Unlike that case, there is no court decision behind this choice: the decision rests on our own analysis of the reports the institute published, which we make available below as evidence.

The first sign was in the sample's income profile. In the 9 October report, the breakdown by "economic level" puts 83.9% of respondents at up to two minimum wages. Among the other institutes with runoff polls, that band ranges from 31% to 49%. On its own, this could be no more than a disclosure problem, since the institute might use a different criterion (individual rather than household income, for example), but the report does not say which. The same profile, to the same decimal places, is repeated in every national report since July.

The more serious problems, however, are in the crosstabs. The runoff reports do not include them, but the reports for the June-to-August polls do. Comparing the reports of 31 July and 29 August:

  • One candidate's numbers reappear under another. Cabo Daciolo's column in July is identical to Wilson Grassi's in August in 22 of 23 cuts. The same happens between Leonardo Avalanche (July) and Pablo Marçal (August) in 19 of 23.
  • Across the two first-round crosstab tables, 260 of 345 numbers are identical (137 of 165 by sex and age; 123 of 180 by education and income). In the cuts by sex and age, half of Lula's and Flávio's numbers (11 of 22) did not change, and the rest changed by exactly 1 or 2 points, always keeping the same decimal.
  • In the runoff simulation, 23 of 44 numbers by sex and age are identical, and none changes by more than 2 points. Even so, the topline shows Lula falling 3 points and Flávio rising 4. In the cuts by income, no change exceeds 1.5 points. With the same sample composition, as declared by the company itself, that combination is mathematically impossible.
  • Within the August report itself, 2.5% of respondents appear as "don't know" in the runoff, yet that figure lies between 3.9% and 6.4% in every demographic cut. A total cannot be smaller than all of its parts.
  • The same pattern already appeared between June and July. In the runoff simulation, the 21-to-24 age cut carries exactly the same numbers for Lula and Flávio (47.3% and 42.0%) in the June, July and August reports.

To make sure the criterion was applied evenly, we ran the same tests on the runoff polls of the other 12 institutes we follow. In all of them, the crosstabs are consistent with the topline.

We also note that the exclusion is not a judgment on the accuracy of individual numbers, but on the impossibility of verifying Vox Brasil's work when the published data are not consistent with themselves. The exclusion is temporary and may be reviewed if the institute provides an explanation or the polls' microdata.

Without Vox Brasil's polls, the model gives Lula a 20% chance. Including the poll released today, it would be 22%.

The reports analyzed, as published:

17 Oct 20261 day · 1 day with no change to the published figuregenerated automatically
16 Oct 2026 · P(Flávio) 79% (-3) · runoff polls: 17 (+3) after the first round, 151 beforegenerated automatically · move above the threshold
9 Oct 2026 – 15 Oct 20267 days · P(Flávio) 84% → 82% · 2 days with no change to the published figuregenerated automatically
8 Oct 2026 · P(Flávio) 86% (+3) · runoff polls: 2 (+2) after the first round, 151 beforegenerated automatically · move above the threshold
7 Oct 2026 Commentary

The model in the first round, the polls and the runoff model

7 Oct 2026 · P(Flávio) 83% · runoff polls: 0 after the first round, 151 before

Our note of 14 September set out four ways of evaluating the presidential forecast model's performance. Although the election is not over yet, here is our partial assessment of how the model behaved in the first round, historically the hardest part of Brazilian presidential elections to predict.

How the model did

The last update published on the eve of the election projected medians of 44.9% of valid votes for Lula (PT) and 44.3% for Flávio Bolsonaro (PL), with a 99.6% probability of a runoff between the two. The official result was 47.0% for Flávio and 45.2% for Lula.

Were the results within the model's intervals? Largely, yes. In the last update, the official result was inside the 90% confidence ranges of five of the six main candidates: Romeu Zema (NOVO) finished slightly below his. However, Flávio's result ended up close to the upper limit of his range (47.4%), and it had been above the range for most of the campaign.

How far from the median? For Lula, only 0.3 percentage points above the projection; for Cury, Renan and Caiado, between 0.3 and 0.7 points below. For Flávio, 2.7 points above. In other words, the model's central projection underestimated Flávio and slightly overestimated the smaller candidates.

Which direction did the model point in over the final days? Flávio grew steadily in the projections of the last few days. Between 30 September and 3 October, Flávio gained 2 points in the projection, while his chance of finishing the first round in front rose from 29% to 39%. The direction was right, but the model underestimated its strength.

How did the model arrive at this result? Our poll aggregator showed a 1.6-point lead for Lula in valid votes, in line with other aggregators such as BBC/PollingData (list of aggregators). The model's median projection, however, saw a lead of only 0.6 points for Lula. Most of that difference comes from a mechanism in the model that estimates the likelihood of voters anticipating the runoff, the so-called "tactical vote" (voto útil), in which the pattern of transfers from the smaller candidates to the two leaders was decisive in narrowing the gap.

One way of seeing this is through the two leaders. The combined valid-vote share of Lula and Flávio was 87.2% in the aggregator, while the sum of their medians in the model was 89.2%. The final result of that sum was 92.2%. In other words, the model's term for the consolidation of the vote around the two leaders helped reduce the imprecision of the aggregated polls and better anticipate the chances of a first-round result favourable to Flávio.

How the polls did

Our model depends heavily on opinion polls, which, despite constant complaints about their accuracy, are still the best tool for anticipating how the electorate is likely to behave. Consequently, if the picture the polls present on the eve of the election differs significantly from the result, the model will find it harder to project.

The gap between Lula and Flávio in the aggregator was +1.6 points, while the result was -1.9 points, an error of about 3.5 points in valid votes (setting aside the fact that the polls also slightly overestimated the smaller candidates' support). Although it looks like a large error, it was not evenly spread: four of the fifteen institutes that released numbers in the final week had Flávio ahead of Lula, while others had numbers compatible with the official result within their margins of error. In other words, there was reasonable uncertainty about who would come out in front on Sunday.

Many people's surprise, and the idea that "the polls got it wrong", come from a hasty and selective reading of the institutes. First of all, it is not possible to say with certainty that a particular institute "got it wrong": what changes are the assumptions needed to reconcile the projected number with the result. For example, can we say Quaest "got it wrong" if its estimates for every candidate were within the margin of error (2 points) of its valid-vote projection? Sampling error alone explains the difference. On the other hand, more divergent projections such as MDA's depend on other assumptions, such as high differential abstention or large last-minute shifts in the electorate.

In other words, the polls' "error" has to be explained in terms of its plausibility under statistical criteria. In the aggregator, we see movement in favour of Flávio (more) and Lula (less) over the last two weeks, which supports the idea that tactical voting consolidated and likely accelerated at the end. In addition, the polls as a whole improved in 2026 compared with 2022 on three important counts:

  • They estimated the distance between the two main candidates better: in 2022, the average of the final week's polls missed the gap between Lula and Jair Bolsonaro by about 4.2 points; in 2026, our aggregator's error was 3.5 points.
  • The polls correctly estimated the real chance of a first-round victory as close to zero: even with the result he got, Flávio would have needed to "take" almost 4 million votes from the other candidates, a very implausible shift given the polarisation and his rejection rates.
  • They also better identified the plausible direction of the last-minute movement in the electorate. In 2022, the polls on average moved away from the final result in the last week; in 2026, almost all of those that published on the eve of the election (seven out of eight) moved towards the result.

The terms in the forecast model helped show how these factors amplified the chance of seeing something like the official result.

Second, much of the public's astonishment was caused by a selective reading of the data. On one side, many Lula supporters expressed disbelief and questioned the methodological integrity of some polls (and of our model) based solely on the results they showed, despite these being established institutes, with national polls in previous elections and a track record that can be assessed, such as Gerp and Futura. On the other, the preference for looking at one or two institutes instead of checking the aggregators led to undue confidence in one or two numbers, undermining the assessment of the uncertainty surrounding this race.

And now, in the runoff?

Uncertainty falls drastically in the runoff, and the forecast model becomes simpler. With the official results in hand, what remains is to estimate a few things: how much of their electorates the two finalists will retain in the runoff, how many voters from other candidates they will persuade, how abstention and blank and spoiled votes will behave, and finally how much movement can happen in the last three weeks of the campaign.

Since 5 October, the model has projected the runoff taking into account how these factors may play out. Historical patterns of vote transfers from the first round to the runoff are applied, with uncertainty about the transfer profile of each type of voter: those who chose other candidates, those who chose to stay at home and also those who voted for Lula or Flávio. In addition, we give some weight to the polls that simulated a runoff between the two before 4 October.

As runoff polls conducted after the first round are published, they will be incorporated into the model. Even so, the uncertainty about the result will still be calibrated according to how much the polls have historically shifted in presidential runoffs. While in the first round the difference between polls and results is relatively large and has always tended to overstate the PT candidate's lead, in the runoff the polling average is much more accurate and shows no particular direction.

The model's first publication has Flávio winning in 83% of simulations and Lula in 17%, a probability comparable to rolling a given number on an ordinary die. The average valid-vote share is 51.8% for Flávio and 48.2% for Lula. Flávio's chances rose by 20 points entirely because of the first-round result. In the simulations run on the eve of the vote in which the first round ended much like the official result, Lula's probability was between 14% and 19%.

6 Oct 20261 day · 1 day with no change to the published figuregenerated automatically
5 Oct 2026 Record v2.00

The runoff model begins

5 Oct 2026 · runoff model begins · P(Flávio) 83% · runoff polls: 0 after the first round, 151 before

From today, the presidential model forecasts the runoff between Flávio Bolsonaro and Lula, starting from the official first-round result. A detailed explanation of the new model, with an assessment of how it did in the first round, will follow shortly.

3 Oct 2026 · P(Flávio) 63% (+5) · 152 national polls (+11) · 410 state polls (+22)generated automatically · move above the threshold
25 Sep 2026 – 2 Oct 20268 days · P(Flávio) 63% → 58% · 3 days with no change to the published figuregenerated automatically
24 Sep 2026 · P(Flávio) 65% (+4) · 130 national polls (+6) · 332 state polls (+11)generated automatically · move above the threshold
18 Sep 2026 – 23 Sep 20266 days · P(Flávio) 59% → 61% · 3 days with no change to the published figuregenerated automatically
17 Sep 2026 · P(Flávio) 58% (+4) · 120 national polls (+5) · 273 state polls (+4)generated automatically · move above the threshold
16 Sep 20261 day · 1 day with no change to the published figuregenerated automatically
15 Sep 2026 · P(Flávio) 54% (-5) · 115 national polls (+2) · 266 state polls (+4)generated automatically · move above the threshold
14 Sep 2026 Commentary

How to evaluate the presidential model's performance

14 Sep 2026 · P(Flávio) 59% · 113 national polls (+2) · 262 state polls

Probabilistic projections such as Plano Político's presidential model should not be read as a guaranteed forecast of the election result. On the contrary, the purpose of a statistical model like this one is to quantify the uncertainty that exists around the outcome, informed by the record of past elections. If the model is perfectly calibrated, a candidate given a 10% chance will win one election in ten.

Presidential elections, however, are rare events: they happen only once every four years, each with a different cast of candidates and a different political context. It would be easy to artificially inflate the model's uncertainty so that it is "never wrong", but that would undermine its analytical usefulness. On the other hand, an overconfident model creates the opposite problem: mistaking a temporary trend for inevitability.

We are twenty days from the first round of the presidential election. A great deal can happen in twenty days, and the electorate reacts increasingly quickly the closer it gets to polling day: in 2014, for instance, at this same stage of the campaign, Marina was favourite to face Dilma in the runoff; in the final week Aécio overtook her and finished the first round twelve percentage points ahead.

A probabilistic model cannot predict the exact result; instead, it maps out those possibilities so that they are on the radar of anyone following the election. The best way to evaluate the model, then, once we know the result on 4 October, is to be guided by the following points:

  • Were each candidate's individual results within the model's confidence intervals?
  • If so, how far were they from the median projection?
  • Did the direction the model pointed in over its final days indicate a greater or a lesser likelihood of the eventual result?
  • Finally, which terms in the model were decisive in landing closer to — or further from — the final result?

In the days following the election, Plano Político will publish an analysis of the presidential model's results in light of these questions, pointing out what it got right and wrong and, should there be a runoff, an explanation of how the model will work in the race's second phase. The reason is simple: although it is technically a "new election", the runoff takes place in the shadow of the first round's results, which allow the two remaining candidates' probabilities to be read with far greater clarity.

11 Sep 2026 – 13 Sep 20263 days · P(Flávio) 56% → 59% · 1 day with no change to the published figuregenerated automatically
10 Sep 2026 · P(Flávio) 56% (+3) · 109 national polls (+2) · 258 state polls (+9)generated automatically · move above the threshold
9 Sep 2026 Data

The lead changes hands

9 Sep 2026 · P(Flávio) 53% (+5) · 107 national polls (+3) · 249 state polls (+2)

For the first time, Plano Político's presidential model gives Flávio Bolsonaro (PL) a probabilistic advantage over Lula (PT). The Rio senator's chances have been climbing over the past two weeks, driven above all by his gains in runoff scenarios across practically every poll released during September. Today, with three national polls released — two showing Flávio ahead in the runoff and one a tie — Lula records his worst probabilistic result since the model was published, and across the reconstructed record going back to 5 April of this year.

There is no way to separate out how much of this movement comes from recent news coverage. The swing towards Flávio is not without precedent: in 2022 his father, then-president Jair Bolsonaro, also gained ground in the polls over the same period, in late August and early September. That year the polling movement reversed in the second half of the month, which did not stop the former president from finishing above what the final week's polls had projected.

Our model projects an average runoff result of 50.5% for Flávio against 49.5% for Lula. That is the average across all simulations in which both candidates reach the second round. Many simulations therefore return results more favourable to each of them, which leaves the outcome still highly uncertain and makes for a very close election. Even so, there is no denying that the current picture favours the PL candidate.

8 Sep 20261 day · 1 day with no change to the published figuregenerated automatically
7 Sep 2026 · P(Lula) 48% (-3) · 103 national polls (+1) · 235 state polls (+1)generated automatically · move above the threshold
4 Sep 2026 – 6 Sep 20263 days · P(Lula) 51% → 51% · 2 days with no change to the published figuregenerated automatically
3 Sep 2026 Record v1.11

A fix to the momentum modules

3 Sep 2026 · P(Lula) 52% (-3) · 102 national polls (+3) · 228 state polls (+10)

This version of the model fixes defects in the previous one that let the detection of movement in the polls overstate the estimates of candidates who are gaining ground, by failing to identify correctly when that growth has stopped. The revision has very small effects on the current estimates, except on the confidence intervals of the smaller candidates, Augusto Cury in particular. The movement in the probabilities seen today is not caused by these fixes, but by the new information coming from the polls published this week. The history has not been recalculated.

31 Aug 2026 – 2 Sep 20263 days · P(Lula) 59% → 55% · 1 day with no change to the published figuregenerated automatically
30 Aug 2026 Record v1.10

Adding Augusto Cury to the win probabilities

30 Aug 2026 · P(Lula) 59% (-1) · 95 national polls · 215 state polls (+3)

The new version of the model we are publishing today also shows the chances of Augusto Cury, of AVANTE, of winning the presidential election. The changes required keep the model's underlying logic intact: Cury as a candidate is mapped onto our base according to his target audience within the Brazilian electorate, and compared directly against the polls to estimate his room to grow and how his voters would behave in hypothetical runoff scenarios.

This change was planned from the model's creation, though not specifically for Cury. The five candidates we have been tracking here since the model was published launched their candidacies many months ago, before the April resign-to-run deadline. Historically, candidacies like Cury's are not necessarily confirmed until the party conventions. Once they are confirmed and registered, we monitor every minor candidacy in case one or more of them shows growth capable of changing the course of the campaign. That is Cury's case now.

In our poll aggregator, Cury held steady through all of July and the first half of August, moving between 1.48% and 1.80%. Since then he has moved above that band, reaching 2.07% on 26 August and closing the month at 2.04%. On top of that, over the past week several indicators of rising interest in his candidacy have run above their normal levels, including Instagram follower counts and Google searches, as well as growth in voting intention in private trackers — noting that we do not publish figures that are not publicly available.

Given the evidence, both the Presidential Model and the Aggregator will show voting intention and win probabilities for Augusto Cury from today, 30 August, onwards. The changes to the model do not affect the rest of the reconstruction we published, but they do directly affect the numbers from today onwards. Previously published estimates stand as the historical record, which has not been recalculated to account for his inclusion.

27 Aug 2026 – 29 Aug 20263 days · P(Lula) 60% → 60%generated automatically
26 Aug 2026 Record v1.01

Marçal, valid votes, and pollster weighting

26 Aug 2026 · P(Lula) 61% · 93 national polls (+1) · 186 state polls

Pablo Marçal's candidacy is unlikely to be approved, but while it stands, a TSE resolution requires pollsters to include him in stimulated first-round scenarios until the case is decided. Our aggregator always prefers the scenario without Marçal, but not every pollster publishes both. So we built a two-stage correction: in the polls that carry both scenarios — Datafolha, Quaest and Indexa among them — we measure how much of Marçal's support goes to Flávio Bolsonaro, and we only apply the correction if the estimate is statistically significant. For now the readings vary far too much from poll to poll, from −40% to +75%. On top of that, Marçal polls at 1% to 2% in most scenarios, too small to measure against. The correction is in the model but is not being applied for the time being; it will kick in if and when the data supports it.

Testing that correction surfaced a bug in our code, since fixed: in some state polls, minor candidates were being counted as blank, null and undecided votes, which artificially inflated Lula's and Flávio's first-round valid-vote shares. With the fix, the chance of the race being decided in the first round fell from 10% (on 24 August) to 4%, and Lula's probability of winning went from 64% to 61%. That shift also reflects the most recent polls, which were more favorable to Flávio. We also adjusted how much weight the Aggregator gives pollsters that were accumulating influence simply by publishing more often. The model's entire history has been rebuilt with these corrections.

25 Aug 2026 · P(Lula) 61% (-3) · 92 national polls (+1) · 186 state polls (+12)generated automatically · move above the threshold
19 Aug 2026 – 24 Aug 20266 days · P(Lula) 64% → 64% · 4 days with no change to the published figuregenerated automatically

Veritá polls removed

18 Aug 2026 · P(Lula) 64% · 89 national polls (-2) · 158 state polls (-19)

After several legal actions against Instituto Veritá's polls — including one suspension over suspected duplication of respondent records — we decided to remove their polls from the Aggregator and the Presidential Model. The effect on the Presidential Model's numbers was below rounding margins, but we're reporting it here to explain the change in the number of polls the model considers.

The judicially suspended polls were never part of our database to begin with: we only include polls whose numbers were published in the press, and a suspended poll cannot legally have its results disclosed. The decision to also remove Veritá's other polls — the ones no court has suspended — is a precaution, and it mainly affects state-level estimates in a handful of states.

It's worth stressing that we only remove polls when strictly necessary. Many legal challenges against polls, especially state-level ones, are frivolous. That is not the case here: the action cited above rested on statistical analysis that found data duplication in a poll conducted in Amazonas.

16 Aug 2026 – 17 Aug 20262 days · P(Lula) 63% → 64% · 1 day with no change to the published figuregenerated automatically
15 Aug 2026 Record v1.00

First publication

15 Aug 2026 · P(Lula) 63% · 90 national polls · 175 state polls

Welcome to Plano Político's 2026 Presidential Model. This model is a probabilistic projection of Brazil's 2026 presidential election, built from public data on election results and opinion polls, with the aim of mapping the probabilities and the uncertainties of the presidential campaign. To read more about the model, see the methodology. This page will publish every change to the model's results, as well as any corrections to its architecture that prove necessary over the course of the campaign.

As of 15 August, the win probabilities are as follows: 63% for Lula (PT), 33% for Flávio Bolsonaro (PL), 2% for Renan Santos (MISSÃO), 1% for Ronaldo Caiado (PSD) and Romeu Zema (NOVO). The probability of the election being decided in the first round is 12%.